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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether there is a frame difference in online news coverage of the 
controversial 2014 Crimean referendum by The New York Times and the Russian newspaper, 
Kommersant. The research is grounded in framing theory and literature on the attribution of 
news sources. The study is conducted in two languages and it seeks to examine how media 
systems, perspectives on the issue, journalistic standards, as well as cultural backgrounds and 
historical ties influenced framing of the event. 
Sample online articles from each newspaper were selected and a quantitative content 
analysis was performed in order to identify the main themes, frames and source attribution 
patterns in media news coverage about the referendum. The pattern to quote official sources 
for providing justification and legitimacy to news stories has influenced the coverage in both 
newspapers:  both The New York Times as well as Kommersant heavily relied on their 
respective government officials and experts. However, The New York Times provided a 
greater diversity of opinions supporting the values of a libertarian media system.  
Politics was the dominant theme of the referendum-related articles in both newspapers, 
however, Kommersant and The New York Times touched on economy and military themes 
with different frequencies. A comparison between themes in two periods (before and after the 
referendum) has not shown a meaningful difference for both newspapers. 
Kommersant’s online coverage was less critical of Russian policies and frequently 
utilized a set of the For-referendum frames, rarely touching upon Russian military activities 
on the peninsula. However, the frame depicting breach of international law appeared with the 
same frequency as the For-referendum frames, showing that Kommersant tried to maintain 
v 
independence under the Russian neo-authoritarian media system. The New York Times 
focused on the illegitimate character of Crimean annexation and exposed every move of 
Russian troops, which is in line with U.S. foreign policy aims. However, the American 
publications did not hide the cultural and historical ties between Crimea and Russia and 
frequently mentioned the illegal character pertaining to Ukrainian protests and a temporary 
government. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
At the end of 2013 Ukraine experienced anti-government protests after Ukrainian 
president Viktor Yanukovych postponed the signing of the Association Agreement with the 
European Union under economic pressure from Russia (“Ukraine suspends preparations”, 
2013). The protests in Kiev escalated into violent mass riots that left dozens of people dead 
and eventually led to the ouster of Yanukovych. The unrest spread beyond the capital and 
shifted to eastern Ukraine and Crimea, an autonomous part of Ukraine with close historical 
and cultural ties to Russia and the ethnic Russian majority. On February 27, 2014 
unidentified armed men seized the headquarters of the Crimean local government, while an 
emergency session of the Crimean parliament voted for a new head –Sergey Aksyonov, the 
leader of a pro-Russia political party (Siddique, McCarthy, & Yuhas, 2014). A few days later 
the Crimean parliament voted unanimously in favor of formally seceding from Ukraine and 
becoming part of Russia. It was also decided to conduct a public referendum on the issue. 
The referendum on Crimea’s status took place on March 16, 2014 and an overwhelming 
majority of Crimeans supported reunification with Russia (Herszenhorn, 2014). Ukraine, U.S. 
and EU officials criticized the referendum as illegitimate, however, on March 18 Russian 
president Vladimir Putin signed a treaty to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation. 
The Western world refuses to recognize Crimea as a part of Russia condemning the 
annexation and Russia’s violation of international law (“Ukraine: Putin signs Crimea 
annexation”, 2014).  
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The 2014 Crimean crisis has drawn a lot of media attention internationally. The 
annexation has been of political interest to many parties around the world and has intensified 
discussions about sovereignty, the right of self-determination, international law and a future 
political and economic landscape. The mass media is very powerful and influential in shaping 
public opinion regarding various issues, because “media may not only tell us what to think 
about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently, what to think” (McCombs & Shaw, 
1993, p. 65). To general public, the understanding of the events in Ukraine is totally 
dependent on news media such as newspapers, TV news, and online news (Watanabe, 2014). 
In that regard, it is important to explore media coverage of Crimea’s annexation and uncover 
how different parties portrayed the event. 
To date there has been little research on the nature of news coverage of Crimea 
annexation by Russia in 2014 and there have been few studies examining the framing 
differences of online publications by American and Russian newspapers. The particular 
countries were chosen because they represent different media systems (libertarian and neo-
authoritarian), have different cultural backgrounds and hold opposite views on the events that 
happened ahead and followed the referendum on Crimean status. The study seeks to examine 
how those differences affected news framing of Crimea’s annexation. Of particular interest is 
the fact that Russia played a major role in the event and the fact that it has yet to be 
uncovered how Russia justified its controversial actions. 
As news sources may have a significant effect on a news story (Shoemaker and Reese, 
1991), the study also explores what sources the reporters from different countries utilized in 
their publications. Content analysis and cross-cultural comparison of online publications by 
The New York Times and Kommersant is used in order to reach that goal. These media outlets 
were chosen because they are arguably the most influential newspapers in their respective 
countries that provide high-quality content in their print and digital versions. The study will 
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explore online versions of the newspapers because the Internet has become a major source of 
news (Omar, 2014) and online news consumption has been increasing while print circulation 
keeps dropping (Chyi & Yang, 2009; Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010). The sample under 
study covers a period of two months (one month before the referendum and one month 
afterwards) and it was analyzed by a quantitative content analysis grounded in framing 
theory. This paper contributes to the framing research within the cross-cultural context by 
including Russian and Western news outlets to establish possible differences across 
newspapers and nations.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Framing is one of the most common theories applied for the research in the field of 
communication and media studies. Media framing is considered to be “a tool of power that 
can be used in the struggle to define whose view of the world will predominate” (Hallah, 
1999, p. 223). The thesis is grounded in framing theory, therefore the literature review 
provides an overview of framing theoretical framework and presents previous studies of 
framing applications to international news coverage. 
In order to provide a better understanding of frames in the coverage of Crimea’s 
annexation by Russian and the U.S. newspapers, the review then outlines major differences in 
media systems of those two countries, explains the importance of source attribution patterns 
and presents a context of the Crimean referendum. The final part of the review focuses on the 
various implications involved and explores Russian and Western perspectives on the issue.  
Frame and Framing Process 
The term “frame” was introduced by the English anthropologist Gregory Bateson 
(1972) and was later applied to communication studies by Erving Goffman (1974). 
According to Goffman, a frame is a schema of interpretation that helps people to “locate, 
perceive, identify, and label events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing 
experiences, and guiding actions” (p. 21). Todd Gitlin (1980) defines frames as “persistent 
patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, 
by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (p. 6). As 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) observe, “frames influence opinions by stressing values, 
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facts, and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue 
than they might appear to have under an alternative frame” (p. 569). Similarly, Tankard 
(2001) claims that frames supply a context and suggests “what the issue is through the use of 
selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (p. 100). Reese (2001) notes that frames are 
socially shared and persistent over time. The literature on framing theory indicates that the 
term could be understood as either a noun of frame or the process of framing (Zhang, 1999). 
 According to Wu (2006), framing is “one way, and indeed a most important way, of 
uncovering the complexity of the social construction of reality” (p. 253). Entman (1993) was 
one of the first researchers to define framing within the context of mass communications: “To 
frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 
52). According to Entman (1993), framing involves two processes: selection and salience.    
 Selection entails inclusion and exclusion. Including certain aspects of an issue makes 
them more salient than the aspects of the issue that are excluded by the selection. Selection 
process in framing theory has a lot in common with a gatekeeping concept that highlights 
selection bias by using particular news sources and omitting the ones less admissible to 
journalistic routine practices and media organizations (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). Selection of 
news sources is particularly important for the proposed study that seeks to examine source 
attribution patterns of two media outlets and will be discussed in a separate section of the 
literature review.  
Salience is defined by Entman as “making a piece of information more noticeable, 
meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (p. 53). An increase in salience improves the 
probability that the audience will remember the information. In addition to selection and 
salience, previous studies also indicate that the influence on frame sensitivity and 
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interpretation depends on individual’s attitude and knowledge of an issue, strength of the 
messages, and the amount of exposure one has to a frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007; 
Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). 
 Van Gorp (2007) summarizes several elements that play a role in framing: schemata, 
frame packages, framing devices, and reasoning devices. It is crucial to understand these 
elements for a better comprehension of frame analysis’ results. Schemata are “mentally 
stored clusters of ideas that guide the individual's processing of information” (Entman, 1993, 
p. 53). A frame package is an integrated structured kit for the frame that consists of the 
framing devices and reasoning devices. Framing devices include the word choice, the use of 
metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, depictions, catchphrases, and visual images (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989). In addition, some researchers indicate the importance of “the choices 
about language, quotations and relevant information” (Shah et al. 2002, p. 367), an evaluation 
of the newsworthiness of an event (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Tankard has proposed the most 
comprehensive identification, which consists of eleven framing mechanisms or devices 
(related mostly to news framing): “(1) headlines, (2) subheads, (3) photos, (4) photo captions, 
(5) leads, (6) source selection, (7) quotes selection, (8) pull quotes, (9) logos, (10) statistics 
and charts, and (11) concluding statements and paragraph” (Tankard, 2001, p. 101). Lastly, 
reasoning devices are explicit and implicit reasoning that deal with justifications, causes and 
consequences of the issue being reported.  
   According to Entman (1993), frames have four locations in the communication 
process: communicators, text, receiver, and culture. Communicators (authors of texts) make 
judgments and apply various frames to their texts. The receiver of the message (the reader) is 
either sensitive to those frames and does or does not perceive them. Lastly, culture is 
described as a “set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people 
in a social grouping” (pp. 52-53). This idea was probably built upon Goffman’s idea (1981) 
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about the influence of cultural background on sensitivity to different frames. The influence of 
culture is also important for the study, as it examines framing of coverage by newspapers of 
the two countries with different cultural backgrounds. The four aforementioned locations are 
connected with four functions of frames according to Entman (1993): to define problems, to 
diagnose causes, to make moral judgments, and to suggest remedies. 
After defining a frame and a framing concept and before moving forward to framing of 
international news, it is important to shed light on the process of framing and its stages. 
Scheufele (1999) distinguishes four stages in the framing process: frame building, frame 
setting, individual effects of framing, and journalists as audiences. Frame building focuses on 
how media outlets choose specific frames and negotiate them to their receivers. There are a 
variety of factors that could potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue 
including societal norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, external 
pressures from interest groups and other policy makers, journalistic routines, and ideological 
or political orientation (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978; Bennett & Entman, 
2001). The Crimea case under examination is a highly politicized and controversial issue, the 
potential influence of abovementioned factors on frame building in the coverage of three 
countries is discussed further in the section about the differences of media systems in Russia 
and in the U.S. 
 The second major stage of the framing process is frame setting. Frame setting 
underlines the effects of frames by examining the ways that media highlight different facts 
and values to make an issue appear more relevant (Scheufele, 1999, p. 116). De Vreese 
(2005) claims that frame setting refers to the “interaction between media frames and 
individuals’ prior knowledge and predispositions” (p. 52). Media effects theorists usually 
analyze frame setting on two levels: the macro-level and micro-level effects of that content 
(Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). The concept of two levels is also mentioned by de Vreese 
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(2005) who outlines the individual and the societal level: “An individual level consequence 
may be altered attitudes about an issues based on exposure to certain frames. On the societal 
level, frames may contribute to shaping social level processes such as political socialization, 
decision-making, and collective actions” (de Vreese, 2005, p. 52).  
The individual level discussed by de Vreese (2005) is consistent with the third stage of 
the framing process by Scheufele (2000) that examined how frames of social movements 
influence individuals. Early in 1974 Goffman noticed that journalists package news stories 
and in the process they give stories meaning. McQuail (2003) acknowledges that media 
outlets are the main means of public expression in our society; the frames journalists use help 
readers to process the complex amount of information available. It means that news frames 
are powerful and influential. Tankard (2001) acknowledges “the power of framing comes 
from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realizing it is taking 
place” (p. 97).  However, being themselves the receivers of news from other sources, 
journalists may also be influenced by the frames already in use and then may apply them to 
their stories. Scheufele (1999) calls it a fourth stage of the framing process. 
The previous studies on framing news indicate that media content does not mirror the 
reality: it is through the framing of media discourses that reality is defined and organized 
(Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Tankard, 2001). Mass media outlets decide “not only 
what events to be covered but also how the events are covered” (Liu 2009, p. 6). Thus, 
framing can affect the individual and public knowledge of a news topic, this makes it a 
perfect framework for the study. In the next sections we will focus on different types of 
frames commonly applied to news coverage and examine framing of international and 
political issues. 
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Types of Frames 
Researchers do not always agree on what frames to look for in framing studies. It is 
generally assumed that the types of frames investigated depend on the types of issues under 
examination. Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) summarize types of frames commonly used in 
media studies. They distinguish gain and loss frames (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), episodic 
and thematic frames (Iyengar, 1991), strategy and issue frames (Capella & Jamieson, 1997), or 
human interest, conflict and economic consequences frames (Price et al., 1997). In addition to 
conflict, human interest and economic consequences frames, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) 
identify the frame of attribution of responsibility and the morality frame. The aforementioned 
sets of frames are usually referred to as generic (de Vreese, 2005), because it is possible to 
apply them to various issues across disciplines. However, mass communication studies have 
also examined issue-specific frames applicable only to specific topics or events (de Vreese, 
2005). Pan & Kosicki  (1993) claim that issue-specific frames can significantly influence 
perception and interpretation of stories. “An issue-specific approach to the study of news 
frames allows for a profound level of specificity and details relevant to the event or issue under 
investigation” (Semetko & de Vreese, 2004, p. 93). As the issue of the Crimean referendum is 
very complex and unique, the research will be focused on certain generic frames as well as 
issue-specific frames that are defined by preliminary analysis that examined the related 
publications for “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped 
images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of 
facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52). By defining the frames in this manner we will 
provide insight into the complexity of how the occasion was covered by media outlets of two 
different countries. 
De Vreese (2004) also outlines two approaches for frame identification: 1) the inductive 
approach “refrains from analyzing news stories with a prior defined news frames in mind” 2) 
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the deductive approach “investigates frames that are defined and operationalized prior to the 
investigation” (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53). As the focus of the study is on generic and issue-
specific frames, the research utilizes both approaches. A preliminary analysis of media 
coverage identified the most commonly used frames, the application of these frames will be 
further examined by the use of content analysis techniques. 
Framing International News and Political Issues 
According to Flournoy and Stewart (1997), the audience's perception of a foreign 
country is under the influence of foreign news coverage by their home media. Framing theory 
has been “appropriate for analysing political and public controversy especially in the 
international context because frames have the potential to explain cultural dynamics” (Liu, 
2009, p. 8). Entman (1993) indicates that cultural contexts also might lead to different news 
framing and further difference in interpretation. However, cultural context is not a single 
variable that influences the perception of international and political news. Lippmann (1921) 
acknowledges that “the artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the 
comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs” force 
people to rely on the information from the media outlets so they can know more about the 
world events (p. 22). As certain events are distant and there is less approach and personal 
involvement in the issue, framing is much more easier to be achieved (McQuail, 2000). 
Shoemaker et al. (1991) note that events that occurred in nations perceived as important in 
U.S. politics and economics had a greater chance to appear in news coverage. Kunczik (2002) 
acknowledges that geographical and cultural proximity as well as tighter economic or 
ideological relations with a foreign country lead to more intensive coverage of the country. 
Previous studies on framing also indicate that the framing theory is impacted by the 
socio-political reality (Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1992; Pan et al., 1999). Bazaa and Hsiao 
(2010) note that international news coverage is largely influenced by the state of diplomatic 
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relationship between countries. Scheufele (1999) notes that government bureaucracies and 
other political or corporate actors may potentially influence frame building. The previous 
studies also examined such variables as history (Pan et al., 1999), national interest (Lee & 
Yang, 1995), political ideology (Pan et al., 1999) and diplomatic sensitivity (Wang, 1992). 
“Critical researchers consider media framing essentially a tool of power that can be used in the 
struggle to define whose view of the world will predominate” (Hallah, 1999, p. 223). The 
Crimean referendum had a wide international coverage and for a better understanding of 
frames used in that particular case, it is important to overview a few examples of previous 
studies on framing of international news, when political context, different ideologies and 
media systems played a crucial role. 
Framing International News: Examples 
One of the most vivid examples of how social-political reality influences framing and 
brings bias to news about international events is Entman’s (1991) study which compared the 
U.S. news coverage of two similar international disasters: in 1983 the Soviet Union shot down 
a South Korean civilian airliner and in 1988 the United States shot down an Iranian civilian 
airliner. Due to a larger Cold War narrative, the Soviet Union was considered an enemy as well 
as the Iranians, while South Korea has always been an ally of the United States. Thus, the 
Korean disaster was portrayed as an intentional and deliberate attack by the Soviets, while the 
Iranian airliner was framed by the U.S. media as an unfortunate mistake and tragedy. However, 
it was not only a certain political reality that influenced framing of both events, but also the 
direct involvement of the United States (as a communicator) in one of the incidents. According 
to Graber (1980), the stories of American correspondents abroad must not only mirror the 
American political values, but also confirm American stereotypes. The study examining 
coverage of the 2011 Libyan uprising and NATO intervention by Qatari (Al Jazeera) and 
British (BBC) broadcasters (Al Nahed, 2015) found out that both Qatari and British network 
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displayed a pro-interventionist agenda that was in line with their foreign policy aims and 
political context. It should be noted both Qatar and Britain actively participated in NATO 
intervention. Kolmer and Semetko  (2009) in their analysis of U.S., British, Czech, German, 
South African and  Al Jazeera  news acknowledge that “the reporting of the war was 
conditioned by the national contexts in which it was produced . . . [raising] . . . serious 
questions about the credibility and impartiality of TV news in the reporting of war” (p. 654).    
Findings about the impact of socio-political reality on Russian media framing are also 
consistent with the concept that governmental and political context influence editorial policy. 
For example, the 1999 conflict in Chechnya (when Russia carried out the Second Chechen 
War) was portrayed in Russian media as ‘an anti-terrorist operation…fighting the threat of 
international Islamic terrorism rather than secession’ by utilizing the frame of ‘War on 
Terror’ (Snetkov 2007, p. 1352). Russian media demonized Chechen separatists and framed 
them as “terrorists” linking the Chechen conflict to the global struggle against international 
Islamic terrorism (de Waal 2004, p. 55).  
All of these studies highlight the fact that journalists from different countries lack 
independence when they cover international, politically sensitive issues. However, the lack of 
independence may vary in accordance with a media system of a particular country and 
journalistic practices in use. The next section is focused on differences in the media systems 
of Russia and the U.S. 
Media Systems of Russia and the U.S. 
The classification of media systems has been discussed for many decades; various types 
of media systems have been applied to different countries. The four types of media systems 
identified by Siebert and Schramm (1956) became widely used after the publication of the 
classic book Four Theories of the Press. The authors divide media systems according to the 
following types: authoritarian, libertarian, Soviet communist and social responsibility type. In 
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the authoritarian model, media serve the state through direct governmental control, journalists 
are not allowed to speak out against the state; control is implemented by censorship and 
punishment (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1963; Oates, 2008). In the Soviet communist 
model, media is also controlled by the state, however, this model is defined by a higher 
volume of self-censorship. The main aim of media outlets in Soviet communist model is to 
serve the interests of the working class and provide the Marxist-Leninist view of reality. The 
libertarian model provides full autonomy to journalists and media organizations, allowing 
attacks on the government and welcoming freedom of speech. The social responsibility 
model is very close to the libertarian model, however, journalists are not completely free to 
publish what they like as they have certain obligations to society to provide information and 
balance (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1963; Oates, 2008). Even though these four models 
represent “ideal” situations and are rather simplistic (Oates, 2008), they reflect the major 
differences and can help to identify a particular model for each country under examination.  
According to this classification, the U.S. media system is usually described as 
libertarian, as it welcomes diversity of opinions and operates under the principle of freedom 
of speech (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979; Oates, 2008). This model is characterized by low 
state intervention, a strong form of journalistic professionalism, which is based on the 
“objectivity norm” and political neutrality (Oates, 2008). Under this media system, 
ownership of media is mainly private and there are no quotas for production and content, the 
main emphasis is on transparency (Downey, Downey, & Mihelj, 2012).  
In the case of modern Russia, it is very hard to fit its media system into any of the four 
models. The roots of the Russian media system can be tracked to the Soviet communist 
model. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where media outlets served the 
government and reinforced the Soviet ideology (Zasoursky, 2004), the model ceased to exist. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian media system has gone through a lot of 
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changes: ideological bans were lifted and the 1990 Law on Press abolished censorship 
(Koltsova, 2006). However, Marta Dyczok (2009) notices that even though there were 
numerous official declarations about media’s independence in post-Soviet Russia, media 
outlets of modern Russia “remain essentially dependent on politically powerful actors while 
media content to a great extent reflects governmental policy” (p. 64). One of the most 
fulfilling descriptions of the modern media system in Russia can be found in the essay of de 
Smaele (2010). He states that in Russia the Western media “logic” prevails, however 
“authoritarian practices overrule the societal and media democratization processes” (p. 6).  
De Smaele (2010) also summarizes most commonly used labels concerning Russian media 
system, such as: ‘transitional model’ (Curran & Park, 2000), ‘post-socialist’ (Giorgi, 1995), 
‘post-communist’ media (Sparks, 1997) or ‘neo-authoritarian model’ (Becker, 2004). 
Concerning the Russian media system, the study will utilize the description of neo-
authoritarian model. 
The difference between the media systems of the two countries under examination can 
be also assessed by the Freedom of the Press report by Freedom House, which annually ranks 
the performance of 197 countries according to the level of media independence (“Press 
Freedom Rankings”, 2014). Based on this ranking, in 2014 the U.S. was classified as “Free” 
(30th place out of 197), while Russia as “Not free” ranked 176th out of 197. Based on these 
findings, the study suggests that media coverage of the U.S. with the libertarian media system 
and Russia with the neo-authoritarian media system portrayed the Crimean crisis and 
referendum through different dominant frames. It is also expected that there will be a broader 
range of views (news sources) in the online coverage by the U.S. than by Russia. The 
utilization of news sources is examined in the next section of the literature review as source 
attribution patterns play a crucial role in framing (Tankard, 2001; Entnam, 1993). 
15 
News Sources 
Previous studies indicate that the choice of quotations and source selection is 
significantly important for identifying and measuring news frames (Shah et al. 2002; Tankard, 
2001). Sources provide a reader with the context and guide him toward particular thoughts, 
increasing the authenticity of a story. In media research scholars have utilized such news 
sources as government officials, law-enforcement sources, organizations or corporations, 
people involved or affected by a news issue, etc. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) acknowledge 
that sources may have a significant effect on a news story.  
According to Sigal’s (1973) findings, official sources are quoted more often than 
individuals in news stories. Zoch and Turk (1998) note that media outlets depend on 
government officials for believability and credence. Similarly, Blumler and Gurevitch (1981) 
state that in political news, official sources are usually the dominant sources. However, if the 
selection of sources is limited to political elites, readers lack the diversity of opinions needed 
for a more objective perception, thus they are more likely to be easily manipulated.  
Given the importance of source attribution and its potential influence on the audience, 
the study seeks to explore types of sources utilized by the reporters from Russia and the U.S. in 
the online coverage of the Crimean referendum. In order to understand which factors may have 
influenced Western and Russian coverage and which frames were applied by U.S. and Russian 
media outlets in their news articles, the paper then provides an overview of historical, political, 
economic, military and legal implications of the Crimean crisis, as well as Western and 
Russian perspectives on the issue. 
 
History of Crimea: Overview 
Crimea is a peninsula on the northern coast of the Black Sea with a recorded history 
that traces back to the 5th century BC, when the Greek settlements appeared along the coast. 
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In the early periods of its historical development the territory of Crimea was colonized and 
occupied by many other states and empires including the Romans, Scythians, Bulgars, Gots, 
Huns, Khazars, the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Between 14th-17th century 
the Crimean aristocracy formed its own Khaganate as a part of the Ottoman Empire. The 
modern history of Crimea begins in 1783, when it was conquered by the Russian Empress 
Catherine the Great and became Russian territory.  
The next war outbreak on the peninsula occurred between 1853-1856 – the Crimean 
War when the Russian Empire was fighting against an alliance of Great Britain, France, 
Sardinia, the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire over the domination of the Black Sea. 
By the end of the war, Crimea was devastated and the territory stayed under the Russian 
control, the Black Sea was proclaimed a neutral zone.  
Following the Communist Revolution of 1917, Crimea became a part of the Soviet 
Union and was given a status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921. During 
WWII the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. In 1944 the Soviet Union liberated Crimea, 
but Stalin accused the Crimean Tatars (the native population of Crimea) of co-operating with 
the Nazis and forcibly deported 200,000 Tatars to Siberia (Daydov, 2008). Crimea became an 
overwhelmingly Russian populated territory (Bebler, 2015).  Following the radical ethnic 
cleansing, Crimea lost its pre-war autonomous status and became a part of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).  
Not long after the death of Stalin, in 1954, Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic. Communist officials described this change of Crimea’s affiliation 
as a symbolic brotherly gesture, which marked the 300th anniversary of Ukraine joining the 
Republic (Bebler, 2015). The consequences of this transfer were not dramatic as the changes 
were insignificant because Crimea stayed within the Soviet Union (Wydra, 2014). After an 
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all-Ukrainian referendum in February 1991, the territory of Crimea was upgraded again to the 
status of an autonomous republic within Ukrainian SSR.  
The latest change of Crimean status before the 2014 annexation happened following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. When the agreement on the Soviet collapse was 
signed at the meeting of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarus leaders in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed that Crimea could remain in Ukraine, with Russia's 
Black Sea fleet remaining at the largest Crimean city Sevastopol under lease (Wydra, 2014). 
Crimea was given significant autonomy (its own constitution, legislature and its own 
president). The periods of Crimean territorial affiliation during the 20th century are 
summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Crimean Territorial Affiliation During the 20th Century 
1921-1945 an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the USSR 
1945-1954 an administrative region (oblast) in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic 
1954-1991 an administrative region (oblast) in the Ukrainian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic 
1991-2014 An Autonomous Republic within independent Ukraine 
 
A brief historical overview shows that modern history of Crimea is connected with 
Russia. Not only has Crimea’s Sevastopol long been a home city for the Russian Black Sea 
fleet, but also, according to the all-Ukrainian population census data of 2001, 58.5% of the 
citizens identify themselves as Russian, compared to the 24.4% identifying with Ukraine, and 
12.1% identifying as Crimean Tatar. In 2013-2014 the unprecedented series of events in 
Ukraine provoked significant political changes and shocked the international community: 
Ukrainian civil riots led to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. In the next section we 
examine how the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014 resulted in the annexation of Crimea and 
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provide an overview of the connected implications as well as Russian and Western 
perspectives.  
Ukrainian Crisis and Political Implications 
In November 2013 the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, announced the 
suspension of a trade agreement with the European Union, in order to preserve Ukraine’s 
national security, while seeking cooperation with Russia. This pro-Russian stance of 
Yanukovych led to growing protests on the central square of Kiev - Maidan (these protests 
are usually referred to as ‘Euromaidan’ as protesters demanded closer relations with the 
European Union). By the middle of December, when Ukraine signed an economic agreement 
with Russia instead of the European Union, mass protests had become more organized and 
grown up to 800,000 people (Baczynska, 2014). The Ukrainian Parliament passed, and then 
annulled restrictive anti-protest laws that resulted in several deaths; street riots became even 
more violent, eighty-eight protesters were killed in two days (DeFronzo, 2014).  
Meanwhile, the Crimean autonomous government strongly supported pro-Russian 
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and condemned the unrest. In February, Euromaidan 
swept away the president with the support of an ultra-right militia and other leaders of the 
pro-European opposition. On 21 February, Yanukovych signed a deal with the opposition 
leaders and fled the capital. Suspending the constitution, Parliament voted to remove 
Yanukovych from power and to hold new presidential elections in May, 2014. The newly 
elected temporary government with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was considered 
illegitimate by Russia, the Russian officials viewed the events as a “coup d'état” (Trenin, 
2014). 
The unrest in Kiev triggered a political crisis in Crimea: on 23rd February pro-Russian 
demonstrations took place in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, while Tatar protestors in 
support of Euromaidan clashed with pro-Russian protestors in Simferopol, another major 
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Crimean city (Crimean Tatars, 2014). On 27th February, Viktor Yanukovych claimed he was 
still rightful president of Ukraine and asked Russia for protection from extremists in his 
country. On the same day the unidentified troops seized the local Crimean parliament and 
local government buildings, Russian flags were raised over those buildings. At the time of the 
conflict, the Russian government refused to acknowledge that the troops without insignia that 
occupied the Crimean peninsula were Russian Armed Forces and called them “local militias”, 
denying any accusations of international law violations. Under the influence of Russia, 
during this armed occupation the deputies of Crimean parliament elected a pro-Russian 
chairman of the council of ministers of the republic - Sergey Aksyonov. On 1st March, 2014 
the Russian Federation Council (the upper chamber of Parliament) officially approved an 
appeal by President Vladimir Putin to give permission for Russian troops to be sent into 
Ukraine to assist in “the normalization of the social and political situation in that country”  
(Waterfield & Henderson, 2014) and to “protect Russian interests” in Crimea as “self-defense 
forces” for the largely Russian population of that region” (Willi, 2015).  
Following this move from Russia, Crimea’s parliament stated unanimously that the 
district wished to join Russia: the local parliament session voted to hold a regional 
referendum on the status of Crimea. Fifteen days later, the majority of the Crimean 
population (97%) voted for the option to become a part of Russia in a controversial 
referendum condemned by most Western states as illegitimate. On 18 March President Putin 
signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation. 
Legal Implications 
The annexation of Crimea and the Crimean referendum have drawn much international 
attention and sparked a debate about international law. In his March special address to the 
Russian Parliament, Russian president Vladimir Putin stated that the referendum in Crimea 
was held "in full accordance with democratic procedure and international law" and emphasized 
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that Crimea has always been “an inalienable part of Russia” (Mezzofiore, 2014). The opinion 
of most Western countries is opposite for a number of reasons. 
Burke-White in the article Crimea and the International Legal Order (2014) outlines that 
Russia “has cleverly embraced international law and, in so doing, exploited the tension 
between a fundamental principle that prohibits the acquisition of territory through the use of 
force and an equally fundamental right of self-determination to take Crimea as its own” (p. 
65). The first principle is embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “all Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state” (Charter of the United Nations, n.d.). In 1970 
the UN General Assembly also proclaimed “no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat 
or use of force shall be recognized as legal” (General Assembly Resolution 2625, 1970). In his 
March speech, Putin denied all the accusations saying that Russia’s Armed Forces did not 
enter Crimea, they had been already there according to the previously negotiated treaty, and all 
the armed unidentified forces that occupied local facilities by force had no connections with 
Russian Army (“Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions,” 2014). It should be noted, 
that only a year after the events, in March, 2015 Putin finally admitted to ordering Russian 
troops to seize Crimea weeks before it was annexed by Russia.  
The second principle is the principle of self-determination –“respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples”  (Charter of the United Nations, n.d.) that 
provides a post-colonial or severely oppressed population the right to freely determine its 
status in the international community and future government. Burke-White (2014) 
acknowledges that Putin claimed “a broad right of intervention in protecting ethnic Russians, 
and a very low standard for the degree of oppression necessary to trigger the right of self-
determination and subsequent independence” (p.68). In his speech Putin also reminded the 
audience of the U.S. position during the Kosovo conflict: “declarations of independence may, 
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and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of 
international law (“Address by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). 
Finally, Putin concluded his address by arguing that the Russian peoples of Crimea had 
freely and fairly chosen to join with Russia as “the referendum was fair and transparent, and 
the people of Crimea clearly and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to 
be with Russia” (“Address by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). However, in reality 
the Crimea population had only been presented with two options: to reunify “Crimea with 
Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation’” or to restore “the 1992 Crimea constitution and 
the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine” (Brunova-Kalisetska, 2014). Other choices, for 
example, to remain in Ukraine under the current constitutional structure or to become an 
independent state were omitted. Burke-White (2014) states that these factors resulted in the 
UN General Assembly decision to condemn the referendum as illegal. 
As summarized by Giuliani (2015), by annexing Crimea, Vladimir Putin has not only 
violated the fundamental texts of the United Nations, but also violated the statutes of the 
Council of Europe of which Russia is a member, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the terms of 
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by Russia, the U.S., France and the U.K., two 
bilateral treaties signed with Ukraine, as well as the constitutions of Ukraine and Crimea. A 
resolution of the European Parliament dated March, 13th "firmly condemned Russia's act of 
aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognized as such 
by the Russian Federation" (Paul, 2015). Most of the western countries, along with the Ukraine 
and the UN members from North America, Central, Oceania and Africa, have not recognized 
the Republic of Crimea as part of Russia. As of February 2016, Crimea has been recognized 
only by eleven nations other than Russia: Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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Military Implications 
According to the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet of 
1997 between Ukraine and Russia, Russia was entitled to have up to 25,000 troops in Crimea 
as its Black Sea Fleet. Bebler (2015) and other western experts and observers claim that at the 
time of occupation, the estimated number of troops might have exceeded the negotiated 
number and achieved up to 30,000 Russian troops. Bebler (2015) also states that the military 
annexation of Crimea was prepared and professionally executed. In his emotional speech 
after the Crimea annexation, Putin denied all the accusations about military invasion by 
saying that Russian troops were sent to Crimea in line with a previously negotiated treaty, 
and the militias who occupied Crimean local government buildings, airports and other 
facilities were not Russian military, but rather local pro-Russian forces (“Address 
by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). Thus, according to Russian president, Russia 
never violated international law because its military never invaded Crimea.  
According to Bebler (2015), three factors facilitated a successful military operation. 
Firstly, the Russian troops were already legally present on the Crimean peninsula. Secondly, 
the short distances to the most important strategic locations in Crimea “allowed for the quick 
insertion of air transported troops and the acquisition of targets” (Bebler, 2015, p 41). 
Thirdly, the Ukrainian militias of Crimea were given an order from the Ukrainian 
government not to resist. Thus, about 20,000 Ukrainian military personnel capitulated 
without a single shot fired. Moreover, most of them decided to remain in Crimea and swore 
an oath to the Russian flag. Although Russia de facto occupied Crimea, a military occupation 
regime was not established. Bebler (2015) concludes by saying that the annexation of Crimea 
“allowed for an increase in Russian military capabilities by taking over most of the Ukrainian 
Black Sea Fleet, about 190 Ukrainian military installations, stocks of arms, ammunition and 
other equipment” (p. 41). 
23 
Russian Perspective 
The Russian perspective on the Ukrainian crisis and further incorporation of Crimea is 
grounded in three main narratives. 
Firstly, Russia perceives the admission of East European states into the EU and NATO, 
as well as NATO defense strategies (plans to deploy missile defense systems in East Europe) 
as a vital threat to its national security (Block, 2015). In his special address to a joint session 
of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament on March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin clearly 
presented the geopolitical rationale for the annexation of Crimea. NATO’s presence in close 
proximity to Russia’s borders, “on Russia’s historic territories”, remains, to President Putin, 
an unacceptable compromise, thus the annexation prevented Crimea’s possible inclusion into 
the North Atlantic Treaty area (Bebler, 2015). Hansen (2015) also acknowledges that the 
alleged Western support for the “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states such as Georgia 
(2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) became a very important component of the 
contemporary Russian understanding of Self. 
Secondly, Russia sees Ukraine as an important element of its own integration 
processes, “a factor, which guarantees the consolidation of Russian society and which rests 
on a thesis of shared history and shared historical memory” (Shelest, 2015, p.197). In his 
address, Vladimir Putin also highlighted Crimea’s “invaluable civilizational and even sacral 
importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and 
Judaism” (“Address by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). Crimea is framed as a 
region that is inherently Russian (Willi, 2015). The reunification with Crimea was said to 
undo the unconstitutional and unjust division from Russia sixty years earlier (Bebler, 2014). 
Western countries (and particularly the U.S.) are viewed as parties who orchestrated the 
regime change in Kiev in order to set Ukraine against Russia (Hansen, 2015).  In the address 
Putin states: “And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear 
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and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally. After all, they were fully aware that there are 
millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political 
instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions” (“Address 
by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). 
The third main narrative around the Crimean referendum and further annexation is a 
perceived growing threat from far-right extremist parties for the majority of Crimea’s 
population, which identifies themselves as Russians and speaks Russian language. During the 
Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian Parliament proposed a bill to repel the Ukrainian 
language law, which guaranteed the use of two official languages in regions where the size of 
an ethnic minority exceeded 10%. This proposal triggered anxiety and caused demonstrations 
all over the territories where Russian language is widely used. Although the acting Ukrainian 
President Turchynov quickly exercised his veto, the Russian population of Crimea no longer 
felt represented by and within the Ukrainian state. Russia did not recognize a newly elected 
Ukrainian government perceiving it as “neo-Nazi”; from the Russian perspective, by 
annexing the peninsula, Russia helped to protect the Russian people (Wydra, 2014). Putin 
numerously emphasized the need to help Ukraine’s Russian population and protect them 
from the ‘fascist junta’ in Kiev (Motyl, 2015). Shelest (2015) acknowledges that Crimean 
referendum has become a success story only in Russian domestic politics, but it remains a 
failure inside Ukraine and internationally. 
 
Western Perspective 
The conflict over Crimea developed in an international environment, which, apart from 
Ukraine and Russia, directly involved other important actors such as the European Union, the 
United States, the United Nations, NATO, OSCE. Many European countries opposed 
Russia’s international law violations and aggressive stance. The leaders of the 28-member 
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European Union suspended trade and visa liberalization negotiations with Russia and 
threatened “additional and far reaching consequences” should Russia further destabilize 
Ukraine (“Putin's Stance on Ukraine,” 2014). 
Before the Crimean referendum European Union President Herman Van Rompuy 
stated: “We strongly condemn Russia’s unprovoked violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity” (“Extraordinary summit,” 2014). His position was backed by other 
European leaders such as Italian Premier Matteo Renzi, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The U.S. agreed with the new Kiev government that the 
planned Crimea referendum on joining Russia would violate the Ukrainian constitution and 
that any such vote should be held nationwide. Before the referendum President Barack 
Obama noted that “the proposed referendum on the future of Crimea would violate the 
Ukrainian constitution and violate international law” (Burke-White, 2014, p. 74). On March, 
10 British Prime Minister David Cameron said: “Ukraine should be able to choose its own 
future and act as a bridge between Russia and Europe” (Holehouse, 2014). British Foreign 
Secretary William Hague described the political situation as “the ‘biggest crisis’ facing 
Europe in the 21st Century” (Robinson, 2014). 
According to the Western perspective, Russian actions in Crimea constitute a 
fundamental challenge to the order in Europe. Bock, Henneberg and Plank (2014) 
acknowledge that the Western coverage of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which 
undoubtedly violated international law, has been framed as neo-imperialist or even neo-
Soviet response. The authors continue stating that “Russian foreign policy has been portrayed 
as aiming to re-establish imperial control of the ‘‘near abroad’’ (i.e., the newly independent 
republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union)—and in particular of 
Ukraine” (p. 102). Western countries also perceive the military invasion conducted by Russia 
as a very dangerous sign and a possible trigger to the events that would further threaten 
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European security and stability. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Research Questions 
The objective of the thesis is to examine how the Crimean referendum in 2014 was 
covered in online publications of Russian and U.S. newspapers. For that purpose two online 
versions of respected and influential newspapers were selected for further analysis. The New 
York Times and Kommersant were chosen because they are known in the U.S. and Russia as 
leading elite publications providing readers with high-quality print publications and online 
content. Both newspapers are well respected in their countries and reflect the liberal values of 
their readership. 
Founded in 1851, The New York Times is one of the oldest daily newspapers in the U.S. 
with one of the highest print circulations in the country. It covers local, regional and national 
issues and devotes considerable attention to the international news and events. The New York 
Times is considered to be the most authoritative source of information and guidance on issues 
of public policy (Friel & Falk, 2004) that sets the news agenda for citizens, politicians, 
intellectuals and journalists of other media.  
Kommersant is one of the most important dailies in Russia, which specializes in 
reporting national and international politics as well as information about financial markets 
(Beumers, Hutchings, Rulyova, 2008). Kommersant provides in-depth and comprehensive 
coverage and discusses controversial subjects from different angles. In 2015 Kommersant 
newspaper was at the top of “The Most Cited Russian Newspapers” rating, while 
Kommersant online version was among the top 20 most cited web resources (“Ratings of 
federal media,” 2015). Even though the Russian press is ranked as “Not Free”, this 
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newspaper is considered to be one of the liberal and independent sources that “laid the 
foundation for the development of intellectual influence of the press” (Vychuba and Frolov, 
2007, p.51). According to Lipman (2010), Kommersant follows the principles of editorial 
independence and is not controlled or driven by loyalty to the state (p. 157).  
The choice of the newspapers is justified by the fact that both newspapers provide high-
quality content and project the principles of objectivity and neutrality, so their publications 
are considered to be comparable. That provides the researcher with a perfect opportunity to 
explore whether the coverage of the Crimean referendum was influenced by the differences 
in the U.S. and Russian media systems, the differences in their perspectives, political, 
historical, and other implications uncovered by the literature review. The paper seeks to 
examine whether there is a difference in their online coverage and aims to explore which 
news sources the two online newspapers relied on. 
Based on the previous theoretical discussion about framing and media systems of the 
United States and Russia, the following research questions are proposed: 
RQ1 What sources did Kommersant and The New York Times use in their online 
coverage of the Crimean referendum? 
RQ2 On what themes did Kommersant and The New York Times focus in online articles 
on the Crimean referendum? Is there any significant difference in themes between online 
coverage from Russia and the United States? 
RQ3 What is the difference in themes of Kommersant and The New York Times 
publications about the Crimean referendum before it took place and afterwards? 
RQ4 What are the most presented frames in Kommersant’s and The New York Times’ 
online coverage of the Crimean referendum? 
RQ5 Is there any significant difference in utilization of frames in online coverage of 
Kommersant and The New York Times 
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Chapter Four 
 
Method 
In order to examine what news sources, themes, and frames were used in the online 
coverage of The New York Times and Kommersant, the study utilizes content analysis - a 
research method widely used in the field of media and mass communication (Neuendorf, 
2002). According to Berelson (1952), content analysis is a research method used "for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" 
(p. 18). “Content analysis can be used to show how sources of messages construct messages 
and have motivations underlying the messages sent and how a source’s message is intended 
to influence a specific receiver” (Wrench et al., 2008, p. 276). Thus, it is considered to be an 
appropriate method for this study.  
According to de Vreese (2004), there are two approaches for frame identification: 
inductive and deductive. As the Crimean referendum is a unique issue, the inductive 
approach allows the detection of issue-specific frames through a qualitative content analysis 
of related news by identifying “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, 
stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically 
reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52). These issue-specific frames 
then are coded as holistic variables in a manual content analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). 
During the preliminary analysis the researcher had in mind generic frames outlined in 
previous framing studies of news about conflicts and war. Thus, final framing content 
analytical variables were identified inductively and deductively. 
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Data Collection 
All online publications covering the Crimean referendum in the online coverage of The 
New York Times and Kommersant were selected for further analysis, excluding articles with a 
different focus, letters to editors, transcribed live-broadcasts, and editorials. The search of 
publications was performed by using “Crimean referendum” and “referendum in Crimea” key 
phrases in the online databases of The New York Times, and  “Крымский референдум”, 
“референдум в Крыму” key phrases in the online database of Kommersant. The decision to 
conduct the referendum was sudden and articles about the possibility of the referendum had 
not occurred in media before the pro-Russian demonstrations took place in the Crimean city 
of Sevastopol and Crimean local government buildings were seized by unidentified troops in 
late February. For that reason this research is focused on a period of two months: one month 
before the referendum and one month afterwards - from February 15, 2014 to April 16, 2014.  
A total of 182 relevant articles were identified: 80 articles by The New York Times (37 
articles before the referendum and 43 articles afterwards), and 102 articles by Kommersant 
(55 articles before the referendum and 47 articles afterwards).  
 
Table 2 
Distribution of Publications 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Kommersant 102 56.0 56.0 56.0 
The New York 
Times 
80 44.0 44.0 100.0 
Total 182 100.0 100.0  
 
The preliminary reading of the articles about the Crimean referendum identified five 
themes that were used in the referendum online coverage 1) politics, 2) economy/finance,  
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3) military activities/protests, 4) impact of the events on ordinary citizens, 5) other. Using 
these themes, the coder determined the main theme of each news story: if more than half of 
the story was devoted to one of the five themes identified, then the overall story theme was 
identified as such. 
Frames Definitions 
The pre-test study identified a set of frames used in the online coverage of the 
referendum. 
1. “Russia - invader” frame. This frame focuses on the illegitimate character of the 
Crimean referendum and depicts Russia as a violator of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The 
frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords and phrases as “occupation”, 
“annexation”, “Russia’s invasion/aggression”, “Russia invaded Crimea”, “Kremlin’s 
intervention”, “takeover”, “land grab”, “seizure of Crimea”, “incursion into Crimea”, 
“absorption”, “Kremlin’s grasp”. 
2. “For referendum” set of frames. This set of frames emphasizes the legitimate 
character of the Crimean referendum and focuses on the right of Crimea’s self-determination. 
It portrays Ukraine’s government as radicals and nationalists, illegitimate and fascist. The 
frame is divided into sub-frames which will be counted separately: 
2.1           “Protection of the Russian population” frame includes such English as well 
as Russian phrases as “the right to protect the Russian-speaking population”, “a threat to the 
lives and health of Russian citizens”; 
2.2          “Self-determination” frame includes such English as well as Russian phrases 
as “the right of self-determination”, “consistent with international law”; 
2.3         “Illegal Ukrainian government” frame includes such English as well as 
Russian keywords and adjectives describing Ukrainian government as “illegal”, “fascist”, 
“Bandera thugs”, “bandits”, “gangsters”, “an unconstitutional coup”. 
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3. “Against-referendum” set of frames. This set of frames emphasizes the 
illegitimate character of the Crimean referendum and describes it as a farcical, hastily 
arranged violation of international law. The frame is divided into sub frames which will be 
counted separately: 
3.1         “Breach of international law” frame includes such English as well as Russian 
keywords and phrases as “a violation of Ukrainian constitution/ sovereignty/territorial 
integrity”, “Russia’s unlawful actions”, “challenge to international agreements”, “breach of 
international law”, “unconstitutional”, “illegal/illegitimate”, “vote is fiction”. 
3.2        “False referendum” frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords 
describing the Crimean referendum as “separatist”, “farcical”, “false”, “phony”, “rigged”, 
“disputed”, “a farce”, “a fiction”, “a parody”, “a sham”. 
4. “Crimean ties” frame. This frame emphasizes historical and cultural ties of 
Crimea and Russia. The frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords and 
phrases as “predominantly ethnic Russian region”, “the largely pro-Russian region”, 
“close/strong historic and/or linguistic and/or cultural ties to Russia”, “largely Russian-
speaking Crimean peninsula”, “pro-Russian sentiment is widespread”, “home to a Russian 
naval base/Black Sea fleet”, “a nostalgic place in the minds of many Russians”. 
5. “Russian military actions” frame. This frame focuses on Russian military 
operation on the peninsula and assumes that unidentified troops that occupied Crimean 
territory before and during the referendum were Russian special forces. The frame includes 
such English as well as Russian keywords and phrases as “Russian military forces”, “Russian 
troops stripped of identifying insignia”, “Russian military installations”, “deployment of 
Russian special forces”, “military exercise / military maneuvers”, “military preparations”, 
“Russia’s military moves”, “military buildup”, “escalation of Russian military actions”, 
“militiamen, backed by Russian forces”. 
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6. “Threat to peace and security” frame. This frame outlines risks and fears 
concerning the Crimean referendum and/or assumes which states may be occupied by Russia 
in future. The frame includes the mention of the Cold War period and/or includes such 
English as well as Russian keywords and phrases as “to pose a threat to peace and 
security/sovereignty of Europe”, “the next Crimea”, “a threat of military confrontation/ 
response”, “fears of a new military incursion”, “threaten to split society”, “a chilling 
prospect”, “a threat to the individual states of Europe”, “the Russian threat (expansionism), 
“geopolitical risks”, “threats of violence/intimidation”. 
7. Economic consequences frame. This frame emphasizes the economic 
consequences of the Crimean referendum. Neuman et al. (1992) identified it as a common 
frame in the news. The frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords and phrases 
as “sanctions”, “travel/visa bans and/or restrictions”, “asset freezes”, “economic blockade of 
Russia”, “economic punishment”, “suspension of Gazprom exports”, “economic isolation”,  
“damage to the economy”, “to punish/penalize Russia/ Putin”, “impact on the country’s 
economy”, “the state of Russia’s currency/ruble”. 
8. Comparison frame. This frame compares the referendum in Crimea with previous, 
future and hypothetical referendums on the status of other states and includes comparisons 
with Kosovo (Yugoslavia), Catalonia region (Spain), Scotland (Great Britain), Quebec 
(Canada), Dagestan (Russia), Chechnya (Russia), Tibet (China), Taiwan (China), Abkhazia 
(Russia), South Ossetia (Russia), northern Cyprus (Turkey), Nagorno-Karabakh (Russia), 
Transnistria (Moldova), South Sudan (Sudan), Palestine (Israel). 
9. Human interest frame. This frame focuses on the reaction and emotions of 
Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar civilians of Crimea, Russia and Ukraine concerning the 
referendum and possible annexation. According to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), the 
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Human interest frame refers to an effort to personalize the news in order to capture and retain 
audience interest. 
Coding Scheme 
News articles were content analyzed in terms of the main theme, presence or absence of 
sources and presence or absence of frames identified by the preliminary analysis of the 
Crimean referendum online coverage. Each article was used as the primary unit of analysis. 
The analysis is based on the percentage of stories that contains each individual frame. A 
single story may contain multiple frames and sources of attribution. The articles were coded 
according to the following criteria: 
1. Name of newspaper. Kommersant and The New York Times.  
2. Publication date of the article. In order to reveal changes in online coverage of the 
stories, articles from each newspaper were divided into two periods: period 1- before 
the referendum took place (February,15 – March,15), and period 2 – after the 
referendum took place (March,16 – April, 16). 
3. Sources of attribution. The articles were examined for presence or absence of 
statements and quotations from the following sources: Western, Russian and 
Ukrainian government officials (presidents, prime ministers and other local officials), 
Western and Russian experts (political commentators, professors), representatives of 
international organizations (representatives of the UN, the EU, and other 
organizations), news media (other media outlets: newspapers or news agencies, for 
example, The Washington Post, The Guardian, BBC, Associated Press, Izvestia), 
ordinary people and civilians (Ukrainians, Crimean citizens, Russians). 
4. Story frames. “Russia-invader”, “Protection of the Russian population”, “Self-
determination”, “Illegal Ukrainian government”, “Breach of international law”, 
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“False referendum”, “Crimean ties”, “Russian military actions”, “Threat to peace and 
security”, Economic consequences, Comparison frame, and Human interest frame. 
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Chapter Five 
Results and Discussion 
Intercoder Reliability 
Intercoder reliability refers to the extent to which independent coders agree on the 
coding of the content of interest with an application of the same coding scheme. In order to 
assess intercoder reliability of the present study the following steps were taken. First, the 
author (coder 1) coded the 182 news stories that appeared in the selected online 
newspapers, according to the coding scheme. Using the same coding scheme, another 
graduate student (coder 2) in Mass Communications at USF coded 20 % of articles 
(36 stories) that were randomly selected from the pool of 182. Intercoder reliability was 
assessed by two different measures: Percentages of coding agreement and Gwet’s (2014) AC1 
coefficients. The results are presented in Table 3.  
According to Neuendorf (2002, p. 145), percentage agreements “of .90 or greater are 
nearly always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable in most situations, and .70 may be 
appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices.” In this study, seven of the 21 
coding categories showed 80-90% agreement and fourteen reached greater than 90% 
agreement between the two coders. According to Gwet (2014), an AC1 coefficient of .60-.80 
indicates “good” strength of agreement, and an AC1 in the range of .80-1.0 is qualified as 
“very good.”  All AC1 coefficients obtained in this study are thus within the acceptable range 
of agreement.  
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Table 3 
Intercoder Reliability 
Coding Category % Agreement   Gwet’s AC1 
Theme 86.1 .8389 
Frames   
Human Interests 80.6 .6820 
Comparison 86.1 .8027 
Economic Consequences 91.7 .8526 
Threat to Peace 86.1 .8069 
Russian Military  94.4 .8902 
Crimean Ties 86.1 .7459 
False Referendum 88.9 .8688 
Breach of Law 91.7 .8638 
Illegal Government 91.7 .8580 
Self Determination  80.6 .7511 
Protection 91.7 .8876 
Russia-Invader 91.7 .8476 
Sources   
Civilians  100 1.0000 
Media 94.4 .9231 
Representatives 94.4 .9301 
Russian Experts 94.4 .8941 
Western Experts 97.2 .9566 
Ukrainian Officials 97.2 .9535 
Russian Officials 97.2 .9448 
Western Officials 100 1.0000 
 
In this study, the Crimean referendum is used as a case study to analyze and compare 
online media coverage in U.S. and Russian elite newspapers. The analysis of Kommersant 
and The New York Times allows examination of differing perspectives and approaches to the 
reporting of a controversial Crimean referendum in 2014. It provides more insight into how 
national and foreign policy interests, different media systems, various historical and legal 
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implications intersect with reporting practices.  
The research explored what sources the two newspapers relied on, what themes were 
discussed in the online articles about the referendum, and what frames were used in the 
related articles in online coverage of the two countries. Five research questions guided the 
data collection and analysis using SPSS.  
RQ1 What sources did Kommersant and The New York Times use in their online 
coverage of the Crimean referendum? 
A series of pairwise z-tests of differences in proportions were performed in order to 
determine what sources were used in the coverage of both newspapers and in order to 
examine whether there is a significant difference in source attribution patterns between 
Kommersant and The New York Times. The results are summarized in Table 4. The results 
show that there is a significant difference in utilization of quotes and statements from 
Western, Russian and Ukrainian government officials as well as in utilization of citations 
from Western and Russian experts. The most quoted sources for Kommersant are the Russian 
government officials (67.6%) and the Russian experts (56.9%), while the dominant sources 
for The New York Times are the Western government officials (68.8%), followed by the 
quotes from the Russian government officials and the Western experts that appear in the 
coverage with the same frequency – in 37.5% of the stories. These results support the finding 
of Blumler and Gurevitch (1981) that official sources are usually the dominant sources in 
political news. It should be also noted that the statements from the Ukrainian officials are 
found in the Russian newspaper in 12.7% of publications (it occurred to be almost the least 
utilized source), while it is the third most quoted source for the U.S. newspaper (27.5%). 
According to these results, we may assume that the American newspaper offered a greater 
diversity of opinions providing more statements from the parties with differing perspectives 
on the Crimean referendum. However, it should be noted that Kommersant did not only 
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concentrate on the Russian perspective, but also provided statements from the Western 
government officials in 21.6% of its coverage.  
The fourth most utilized source for both newspapers is Crimean and Ukrainian 
civilians: the citations of citizens appear in 17.6% of Kommersant news stories and in 22.5% 
of The New York Times articles. Both newspapers used official sources more often than 
individuals and civilians and this result is consistent with Sigal’s finding (1973). As shown in 
Table 4, the next most used sources by Kommersant are the Western experts and 
Representatives of international organizations that are present in 13.7% of the publications 
followed by the Ukrainian government officials (12.7%), while for The New York Times the 
sources of Crimean and Ukrainian civilians is followed by the Russian experts (17.5%) and 
Representatives of international organizations (16.3%). The least utilized source for both 
newspapers is other media outlets (news agencies, other newspapers, and online sources). 
The quotes from other media outlets can be found in 9.8% of Russian publications and in 
15% of the U.S. publications. 
RQ2 On what themes did Kommersant and The New York Times focus in online 
articles on the Crimean referendum? Is there any significant difference in themes between 
online coverage from Russia and the United States? 
 In order to answer RQ2 the researcher followed a two-step procedure. First, Pearson’s 
Chi-square test was used to test against the null hypothesis that the distribution of themes is 
the same across both newspapers. The Chi-square test results (Table 5) in a p-value are 
smaller than .05 (p=.001), it means that there is strong evidence to state that there is a 
difference in themes distribution across the newspapers. Second, a set of pairwise z-tests of 
differences in proportions were performed in order to determine which particular theme 
significantly differed in online coverage of Kommersant and The New York Times. The 
distribution of themes is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 4 
Crosstab: Sources of Attribution 
 
Source 
Newspaper 
Kommersant 
The New York 
Times 
Western government 
officials 
Count 22a 55b 
% within Online newspaper 21.6% 68.8% 
Russian government 
officials 
Count 69a 30b 
% within Online newspaper 67.6% 37.5% 
Ukrainian 
government officials 
Count 13a 22b 
% within Online newspaper 12.7% 27.5% 
Western experts 
Count 14a 30b 
% within Online newspaper 13.7% 37.5% 
Russian experts 
Count 58a 14b 
% within Online newspaper 56.9% 17.5% 
Representatives of 
international 
organizations 
Count 14a 13a 
% within Online newspaper 13.7% 16.3% 
Media outlets 
Count 10a 12a 
% within Online newspaper 9.8% 15.0% 
Crimean, Ukrainian 
civilians 
Count 18a 18a 
% within Online newspaper 17.6% 22.5% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Newspaper categories whose column proportions do 
not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
Table 5 
Chi-Square Tests: Story Theme 
 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
19.132a 4 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 19.646 4 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.022 1 .882 
N of Valid Cases 182   
a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 4.40. 
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Table 6 
Crosstab: Story Themes 
 
 
Online newspaper 
Total Kommersant 
The New 
York Times 
Story theme politics Count 43a 35a 78 
% within Online 
newspaper 
42.2% 43.8% 42.9% 
economy/finance Count 32a 12b 44 
% within Online 
newspaper 
31.4% 15.0% 24.2% 
military activities/ 
protests 
Count 8a 24b 32 
% within Online 
newspaper 
7.8% 30.0% 17.6% 
impact of the 
events on citizens 
Count 12a 6a 18 
% within Online 
newspaper 
11.8% 7.5% 9.9% 
other Count 7a 3a 10 
% within Online 
newspaper 
6.9% 3.8% 5.5% 
Total Count 102 80 182 
% within Online 
newspaper 
100.0% 100.0%      100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Online newspaper categories whose column proportions 
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
As results indicate, the dominant theme of both newspapers’ publications concerning 
the Crimean referendum is politics, which is followed by economy and finance in 
Kommersant coverage, and military activities and protests in The New York Times coverage. 
A series of z-tests (Table 6) determined that there is a significant difference in distribution of 
these two themes. Kommersant touched upon the economy and finance theme in the coverage 
of the referendum in 31.4% of publications while The New York Times only in 15%. It might 
have happened because the issues of a possible inclusion of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation and the influence of the event on the Russian economy had more direct 
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implications for the Russian audience, while for the American audience the issues of the state 
of Russian and Ukrainian economies and currency were of less significance. The difference 
in the distribution of the theme focused on military activities and protests (7.8% for 
Kommersant and 30% for The New York Times) can be explained by the fact that illegal 
moves of Russian troops on a foreign territory were a very sensitive topic for the Russian 
media as the deployment of troops had not been acknowledged by the Russian 
administration. That might have been the reason why the Russian newspaper did not address 
the military theme in the coverage of the referendum as frequently as the U.S. newspaper. 
The third most popular theme in Kommersant online coverage is the impact of the events on 
citizens (11.8%). Kommersant publications focused on that theme describing the impact of 
depreciation of the ruble and sanctions on ordinary Crimean and Russian citizens’ lives and 
the influence of the crisis on people engaged in the Crimean tourism industry. The New York 
Times concentrated on the impact of the events in 7.5% of the publications and, unlike 
Kommersant, the news stories in The New York Times mentioned the emotions and fears of 
Crimean Tatars. A good example is a story dated March 13, 2014 with a headline “Mindful 
of Past Many Tatars Fear of Russian Future”: 
As Crimea prepares to vote on Sunday on whether to secede from Ukraine and join 
Russia, the prospect of a renewed Russian presence in Crimea evokes for Tatars raw 
memories of Communist-era depredations…Citing examples like Abkhazia and 
Chechnya, many Tatars fear a war that would leave their relatively small population — 
roughly 12 percent of Crimea — subject to ethnic backlash and the sort of repression 
they only recently left behind. (Sneider, 2014) 
The stories under the category of “other” theme appeared in both newspapers with the least 
frequency: 6.9% for Kommersant publications and 3.8% for The New York Times articles. 
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This category included news stories that could not be attributed to any other major theme and 
that could not be grouped in a separate category because of their relatively small number.  
RQ3 What is the difference in themes of Kommersant and The New York Times 
publications about the Crimean referendum before it took place and afterwards? 
The research is also focused on examining a possible difference in themes in 
Kommersant and The New York Times online publications on the Crimean referendum during 
the two time periods: before the referendum was conducted (February 15, 2014 – March 15, 
2014) and afterwards (March 16, 2014 – April 16, 2014). A set of pairwise z-tests (Table 7) 
revealed that there is no significant difference in the distribution of most themes in both 
newspapers. The only difference that is supported by the test is the difference in the 
distribution of  the “economy and finance” theme and “other” themes in the Russian online 
coverage. In the second period Kommersant focused on the “economy and finance” theme 
twice as often as in the first period: the theme of economy appeared in 40% of the news 
stories after the referendum took place. This can be explained by the unexpected 
development of the events: the decision to hold the Crimean referendum was very fast and 
Kommersant reporters could not possibly predict annexation and further economic 
consequences before the referendum was conducted. However, after the referendum took 
place and after the Russian government decided to proceed with “reunification”, Kommersant 
publications started focusing more on economic measures against the Russian Federation and 
on the integration of Crimea into Russia’s economy. The second theme showing the 
difference in the distribution across the two periods is the theme under “other” category. The 
results reveal that the first period includes all the articles coded under the theme “other”, 
which illustrates that during the second period all the examined publications were assigned to 
a certain major theme. According to this finding, we may assume that Kommersant online 
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coverage became a little less diverse and more focused on major topics after the referendum 
took place.  
Table 7 
Crosstab: Story Themes in Period 1 and Period 2 
 
Online newspaper 
Publication date Total 
February 15, 2014 - 
March 15, 2014 
March 16, 2014 - 
April 16, 2014  
Kommersant politics Count 25a 18a 43 
%  45.5% 38.3% 42.2% 
economy/
finance 
Count 11a 21b 32 
%  20.0% 44.7% 31.4% 
military 
activities/ 
protests 
Count 6a 2a 8 
 
%  
 
10.9% 
 
4.3% 
 
7.8% 
the impact 
of the 
events  
Count 6a 6a 12 
 
%  
 
10.9% 
 
12.8% 
 
11.8% 
other Count 7a 0b 7 
%  12.7% 0.0% 6.9% 
Total Count 55 47 102 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
The New 
York 
Times 
 politics Count 17a 18a 35 
%  45.9% 41.9% 43.8% 
economy/
finance 
Count 3a 9a 12 
%  8.1% 20.9% 15.0% 
military 
activities/ 
protests 
Count 12a 12a 24 
 
%  
 
32.4% 
 
27.9% 
 
30.0% 
the impact 
of the 
events  
Count 3a 3a 6 
 
%  
 
8.1% 
 
7.0% 
 
7.5% 
other Count 2a 1a 3 
%  5.4% 2.3% 3.8% 
Total Count 37 43 80 
%          100.0%       100.0%   100.0% 
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Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Publication date categories whose column proportions 
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
RQ4 What are the most presented frames in Kommersant’s and The New York Times’ 
online coverage of the Crimean referendum? 
Kommersant Framing 
As Table 8 shows the most used frame in the Russian newspaper is the Economic 
consequence (n=53, 52%). The prevalence of the Economic consequence frame in the 
Russian newspaper can be attributed to the perceived high level of importance of the 
referendum and its further influence on the state of Russia’s economy. At the beginning of the 
first period Kommersant publications on the Crimean referendum view the event as an 
occasion of Russia’s foreign policy, therefore direct consequences for the Russian economy 
are rarely mentioned. However, after March 7 when the Supreme Council of Crimea voted to 
join Russia, the Economic consequence frame appears almost in half of the sample materials, 
as then the event gradually became an inevitable part of Russia’s domestic policy. The main 
concerns connected with the economy include decline in the value of the ruble and foreign 
investments, the transfer of the Crimea region to ruble transactions, sanctions against senior 
Russian and Crimean officials, asset freezes, visa bans, suspension of Russia from the G8 
group, suspension of Gazprom exports, and Russia’s economic isolation. For example, a news 
story published on March 17, 2014 in Kommersant noted: 
There is some evidence that The European Union has drawn up a list of 130 Russian 
officials responsible for Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They could be subjected to travel 
bans and asset freezes. Also, Russia might be stripped of G8 membership and there is 
possibility of the G7 meeting in London instead of a planned G8 Sochi Summit in 
Russia. (Strokan, 2014) 
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Table 8 
Crosstab: Frames of the Crimean Referendum 
Frame                                Newspaper Total 
 Kommersant The New York 
Times 
 
Russia-invader Count 14a 56b 70 
%  13.7% 70.0% 38.5% 
Protection of the 
Russian 
population 
Count 29a 5b 34 
%  28.4% 6.3% 18.7% 
Self-
determination 
Count 25a 6b 31 
%  24.5% 7.5% 17.0% 
Illegal Ukrainian 
government 
Count 28a 16a 44 
%  27.5% 20.0% 24.2% 
Breach of 
International law 
Count 27a 35b 62 
%  26.5% 43.8% 34.1% 
False referendum  Count 3a 9b 12 
%  2.9% 11.3% 6.6% 
Crimean ties Count 33a 25a 58 
%  32.4% 31.3% 31.9% 
Russian military 
actions 
Count 9a 40b 49 
%  8.8% 50.0% 26.9% 
Threat to peace 
and security 
Count 16a 23b 39 
%  15.7% 28.7% 21.4% 
Economic 
consequences 
Count 53a 35a 88 
%  52.0% 43.8% 48.4% 
Comparison 
frame 
Count 13a  23b 36 
%  12.7% 28.7% 19.8% 
Human interest Count 29a 11b 40 
%  28.4% 13.9% 22.1% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Publication date categories whose column 
proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
The Crimean ties frame is the second most presented frame in Russian online coverage 
(n=33, 32.4%). Before the referendum, Kommersant articles often mention strong historic, 
linguistic, cultural, and spiritual ties of Crimea to Russia. Utilization of this frame provides a 
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certain justification to Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and makes further Russian moves more 
acceptable for the Russian audience. After the referendum, this frame often appears in 
Kommersant publications in quotes and statements of high-level Russian officials. For 
example, a March 19 news report in Kommersant includes the following quote from President 
Vladimir Putin’s address to State Duma deputies: 
Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight 
becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation 
became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided 
by borders (Kolesnikov, 2014). 
The Crimean ties frame is followed by the Human interest frame: 28.4% of Kommersant 
online articles focus on reactions and emotions of Russian citizens, Crimeans, and Tatar 
civilians. Most of the articles are dominated by quotes of civilians with pro-Russian 
sentiment who express enthusiasm concerning “reunification with Russia”. Even though it is 
more of an exception, a contrary point of view can also be found in Kommersant online 
coverage: 
However, for many Crimean citizens the secession from Ukraine is a personal drama. 
Father serves in a brigade of the Russian Black Sea fleet while his son is a Ukrainian 
soldier; mother of a Crimean fiancé is Chairman of the Party of Regions local 
department while mother of a bride is a member of the Batkivschyna party from Lviv… 
(Galustyan, 2014) 
The results also show that more than one-fourth of Kommersant news articles utilized at 
least one of the For-referendum frames: the Protection of the Russian population (n=29, 
28.4%), the Illegal Ukrainian government (n=28, 27.5%), and the Self-determination (n=25, 
24.5%). It can be assumed that Kommersant publications stress the national interest and 
depend on Russian government policy: this finding supports Entman’s (1991) theory that 
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states that socio-political reality influences media framing. An unexpected and interesting 
finding, though, is that the frame focused on violation of international law – the Breach of 
international law – also frequently appears in Russian online articles (n=27, 26.5%). 
Kommersant journalists quote other foreign media (The Wall Street Journal, Le Monde, Le 
Figaro) that report on Russia’s unlawful actions. Kommersant articles also mention various 
foreign leaders who condemned Russia for violation of the Ukrainian constitution and 
territorial integrity. For example, a Kommersant news story of March 17 suggested: 
The referendum is regarded illegitimate by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron, US President Barack Obama, President of the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso and President of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy, Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Japanese Cabinet 
Secretary Yoshihide Suga. (Dudina, 2014) 
The most likely explanation of the relatively high percentage of the Breach of international 
law frame in Kommersant online coverage is that the newspaper known as “one of the last 
strongholds of independent media in Russia” (Henry, Mauldin, & Humber, 2006) tries to 
stand up to high journalistic values. 
Frames that have the lowest frequency in Russian coverage include the Threat to peace 
and security (n=16, 15.7%), the Russia-invader (n=14, 13.7%), the Comparison frame (n=13, 
12.7%), the Russian military actions (n=9, 8.8%) and the False referendum frame (n=3, 
2.9%). All of them, except for a neutral Comparison frame which compares the Crimean 
referendum to other referendums on status, attribute to a controversial character of the 
referendum and characterize Russia as an aggressor. The low percentage of these frames in 
Kommersant can be explained by the influence of Russian national interests, political 
implications and the neo-authoritarian media system. These frames are mostly mentioned in 
the direct quotes of foreign politicians and experts. However, the mere presence of such 
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frames in a number of Kommersant news stories shows that the newspaper tries to cover the 
subject from different perspectives and conform to high standards of journalism, even in the 
media system ranked as “Not Free” by Freedom House. 
The New York Times Framing 
  The most utilized frame in the online coverage of The New York Times is the Russia-
invader frame, which appears in 70% of publications. This frame implies Russian aggressive 
actions toward Ukraine and includes such words as “annexation”, “land grab”, “occupation”, 
“seizure” and “take over”.  The frame also appears in connection with the second most 
presented frame in The New York Times online coverage which focuses on Russian military 
operations on the peninsula – the Russian military actions frame (n=40, 50%). An example of 
both frames is the following paragraph in the March 3, 2014 article of The New York Times: 
But the events unfolding in major Ukrainian cities in recent days appear to match a 
pattern played by the Kremlin in Crimea, where pro-Moscow forces paving the way for 
Russia to seize control were neither altogether spontaneous, nor entirely local (Roth, 
2014). 
As shown in Table 8, the Economic consequence frame is the third most presented frame in 
The New York Times publications (43.8%). In comparison to Kommersant, the American 
newspaper focused its coverage mostly on a possible economic blockade of Russia and such 
economic measures as sanctions or asset freezes, paying less attention to the state of Russia’s 
and Ukraine’s currency and the internal economic issues of Crimea. The Breach of 
international law frame has the same frequency in The New York Times online coverage as 
the Economic consequence (n=35, 43.8%). Unlike Kommersant articles, The New York Times 
publications mention the illegitimate character of the referendum not only in quotes of 
American and European leaders, but also in the reflections of The New York Times reporters. 
The Crimean ties frame was also used in abundance (n=25, 31.3%), although, the interesting 
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finding is that, despite noting pro-Russian sentiment and close ties to Russia, The New York 
Times publications gave a broader perspective and often indicated that the region is also 
populated by a large number of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Thus, the newspaper 
provided more objective reports. For example, the story of March 1, 2014 stated: 
The strategically important peninsula, which has been the subject of military disputes 
for centuries, has strong historic, linguistic and cultural ties to Russia. The population 
of roughly two million is predominantly Russian, followed by a large number of 
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, people of Turkic-Muslim origin. (Smale & Erlanger, 
2014) 
As the results indicate, Threat to peace and security frame emerges in 28.7% of The New York 
Times news stories. This frame is mostly obvious in the coverage with frequently mentioned 
implications and references to the Cold War period, suggesting possible geopolitical risks 
triggered by “Russian expansionism”. A good example of this frame is found in the following 
paragraph of the March 1 report of The New York Times: 
What began three months ago as a protest against the Ukrainian government has now 
turned into a big-power confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War and a significant 
challenge to international agreements on the sanctity of the borders of the post-Soviet 
nations. (Smal & Erlanger, 2014) 
The Comparison frame also appears in 28.7% of The New York Times publications. A large 
portion of the Comparison frame includes references to Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and 
compares the Crimea region to other regions like Catalonia in Spain, South Ossetia in Russia, 
or Scotland in Great Britain. This frame cannot be considered merely as pro or against 
referendum as in various articles different comparisons made by The New York Times 
reporters lead to opposite conclusions, thus The New York Times provided different 
perspectives on the portrayal of this controversial event. The frame of Illegal government, 
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utilized concerning the Ukrainian administration at the time of the conflict, describes 
Ukrainian leaders as “bandits”, “fascists” and “gangsters”. It appears in 20% of The New York 
Times news stories being dominated by the quotes of Russian officials and statements from 
Ukraine’s former president Viktor Yanukovych.  
   The next emerging frame in The New York Times online coverage is the Human 
interest (n=11, 13.9%). While Kommersant utilizes this frame speaking about the reactions of 
Russians or Ukrainian citizens with a pro-Russian position, the same frame in The New York 
Times is dominated by portrayals of Tatar civilians and Crimeans who expressed doubts 
about the referendum. For example, it is hard to imagine that the following paragraph could 
have appeared in Kommersant, however, it emerges in the March 8 news story of the 
American newspaper: 
In Bakhchysaray, the historical center of what was once the Crimean Tatars’ homeland, 
several hundred protesters, mostly Tatar women and children, marched against 
integration with Russia, waving Ukrainian and Tatar flags, and chanting “We’re for 
peace,” “Ukraine is inseparable,” and “Russian soldiers, go home!” (Myers & Erlanger, 
2014) 
The frame False referendum dominated by adjectives “farcical”, “phony”, “disputed”, 
“rigged” in description of the referendum shows up in 11.3% of The New York Times 
publications. This frame, along with Breach of international law frame is included in the 
Against-referendum set of frames. However, unlike the Breach of international law frame 
(which is present in 43.8% of articles), it is one of the three least utilized frames. It can be 
explained by the fact that there was often a fine line between the False referendum frame that 
implies the false and controversial character of the referendum and the Breach of international 
law frame that implies its illegitimate character. The meaning of both frames is very close, 
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but the adjectives indicated in the codebook for the False referendum frame were not used as 
often as it had been assumed before the coding was performed. 
The percentage of the stories under For-referendum set of frames is small: 7.5% for the 
Self-determination frame and 6.3% for the Protection of the Russian population frame. These 
frames mostly appear in statements of Russian officials: often the context of a story implies 
that such justifications of the referendum are groundless. For example, one of The New York 
Times publications cited the Russian ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, who called the Crimean 
referendum an exercise in “self-determination”, while the next paragraph includes the quote 
from the American ambassador, Samantha Power: “I missed the day in law school where self-
determination was defined as Russia-determination” (Sengupta, 2014). Overall, according to 
the analysis of The New York Times online publications, it can be assumed that almost every 
article contained a certain frame as well as some opposing reasoning: allowing the readers of 
The New York Times to make their own decisions and decide “what to think about” the 
Crimean referendum and the parties involved.  
RQ5 Is there any significant difference in utilization of frames in online coverage of 
Kommersant and The New York Times? 
A performed set of pairwise z-tests of difference in proportions (Table 8) revealed that 
only three frames out of twelve did not show a significant difference in utilization by 
Kommersant and The New York Times. The publications of both newspapers did not differ 
considerably in the frequency of the Illegal Ukrainian government frame (27.5% for 
Kommersant versus 20% for The New York Times), the Crimean ties frame (32.4% for 
Kommersant versus 31.3% for The New York Times), and the Economic consequences frame 
(52% for Kommersant versus 43.8% for The New York Times). The most dramatic difference 
is seen in the frame Russia – invader (13.7% for Kommersant versus 70% for The New York 
Times), the Russian military actions (8.8% for Kommersant versus 50% for The New York 
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Times), and both For-referendum frames: the Protection of the Russian population (28.4% for 
Kommersant versus 6.3% for The New York Times) and the Self-determination (24.5% for 
Kommersant versus 7.5% for The New York Times). The difference in percentages is 
considerable, however, such distribution of frames was expected. It can be explained by a 
theoretical section of the research that outlines governmental and political context influence 
on editorial policy. Unsurprisingly, in order to justify the referendum and further Crimean 
secession from Ukraine, the Russian newspaper utilized the For-referendum set of frames 
more frequently and provided less evidence of the illegitimate character of Crimean 
annexation and Russian unlawful military moves, while the U.S. newspaper utilized the For-
referendum frames mostly in the quotes of Russian political leaders and pro-Russian 
population exposing more data about Russian military activities. It should be noted that the 
Russian government had not acknowledged that the Russian military backed Crimean self-
defense forces until April 17 when Vladimir Putin admitted that Russian troops were 
deployed to Crimea (Anischchuk, 2014). That might have been the reason why only 8.8% of 
Kommersant stories contained subtle mentions of Russian military maneuvers. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2014 Crimean referendum was a controversial international event that received 
considerable coverage in the mass media all over the world. This study is a comparative 
framing analysis of online publications from the U.S. and Russia. The event has been of 
political interest to both countries and provided an opportunity to examine themes, source 
attribution patterns and frames in the coverage of liberal, well-respected media outlets in 
Russia (Kommersant) and in the United States (The New York Times). According to 
Watanabe (2014), the understanding of the events in Ukraine totally depended on news 
media. This study has found these two newspapers differently described the same event. The 
reported differences can be explained by variations in political interests, media systems, 
journalistic standards, cultural and historical ties outlined by literature.   
According to Shoemaker and Reese (1991), sources may significantly impact a news 
story. The results of this research on source attribution patterns are consistent with previous 
studies, which have shown that the most common sources in news stories are government 
officials (Sigal, 1973; Zoch & Turk, 1998; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981). Unsurprisingly, 
Russia and the U.S. relied heavily on their respective officials and experts. An important 
finding of the study is that the Ukrainian officials appeared more frequently in The New York 
Times coverage than in Kommersant coverage (27.5% vs 12.7%). This result reflects the 
different perspectives of both countries and shows how media outlets frame the publications 
by utilizing statements of government officials with compatible views to their national 
interests, rather than quotes with opposing views. Overall, The New York Times in 
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comparison to Kommersant showed a greater diversity of news sources. This result can be 
explained by the fact that the liberal media system of the U.S. welcomes diverse opinions 
operating under the principle of freedom of speech (Merill & Lowenstein, 1979). At the same 
time, even though Kommersant is considered one of the liberal and independent media outlets 
in Russia, it still exists under unwritten rules of its neo-authoritarian model and depends on 
the government’s tone and attitude. 
The study’s results have shown the dominant theme of the referendum media coverage 
for both newspapers is politics; however, there is a significant difference in other themes of 
the coverage. The next most popular theme for Kommersant is economy and finance, while 
The New York Times focused on military activities and protests. This finding can be 
explained by the different national political interests that play a significant role in framing the 
international news. The Russian government had not acknowledged the presence of the 
Russian troops on the Crimean peninsula at the time period on which the research focused, so 
Kommersant strayed from revealing the details about Russian military operations. The New 
York Times, following the interests of U.S. foreign policy, exposed facts about aggressive 
Russian conduct. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a comparison between themes in time 
periods before and after the referendum has not revealed a major difference between the 
newspapers. 
The results obtained indicate a meaningful difference in frames used by the two 
newspapers. It has been demonstrated that Russia tended to portray the Crimean referendum 
in a more favorable light, utilizing a set of the For-referendum frames more often than the 
U.S. However, the unexpected finding is that Kommersant often used one of the Against-
referendum frames - Breach of international law. One of the most noteworthy issues to 
consider is that while both newspapers utilized similar frames, they emphasized different 
aspects. For example, the majority of the Human interest frame in Kommersant focused on 
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emotions and reactions of Crimeans and Russians favorable to the referendum, while The 
New York Times concentrated on the event’s impacts on Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars and 
their doubts about the consequences of annexation.  
Summing up the results, one can conclude the media coverage differences arise not 
only from a simplistic contrast between libertarian and neo-authoritarian models of the media 
system, but also come from political and national interests, and the cultural and historical ties 
between involved parties. Consistent with the findings by Reese (2003) and Scheufele 
(2000), the study’s result showed that journalistic norms and routines of the particular media 
outlets also played an important role in the media coverage of the Crimean referendum. The 
results have indicated that Kommersant with a reputation of a liberal newspaper has been 
trying to perform independent reporting in Russia, a country identified by Freedom House as 
“Not Free”, frequently utilizing quotes from Western officials (21.6%) and mentioning 
arguments against the 2014 Crimean referendum. Only a few studies compare coverage of 
media outlets that perform high journalistic standards in countries with different political and 
media systems. This thesis provided evidence that the U.S and the Russian newspapers had a 
different pattern of news coverage. The findings of this research add to the body of literature 
on framing presenting such cross-country comparisons.  
By comparing the online coverage of two newspapers from different nations, the study 
also has implications for international communication research, as it examines numerous 
variables that influence international news coverage. This paper has shown that even though 
both newspapers are considered independent in their respective countries, their foreign 
coverage still relies on governmental sources and reflects their political ideologies. The 
study’s results are also consistent with findings of Bazaa and Hsiao (2010) that indicate the 
international coverage is largely influenced by the states of diplomatic relationships between 
countries. The existence of this tendency as well as the dependence of the audience 
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perception on foreign news coverage by their home media (Flournoy & Stewart, 1997) 
implies readers should rely on a variety of news media in order to get a more complete 
picture of foreign events. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The Crimean referendum attracted a lot of attention around the world. This content 
analysis included only two months of news coverage from two newspapers in two countries. 
A longer-term observation and data collection from various outlets can provide a more 
accurate picture on how media systems and news sources affect the controversial referendum 
framing. Another limitation lies in the chosen methodology as the researcher decided to 
utilize issue-specific frames which, on the one hand, “allow for a profound level of 
specificity and details relevant to the event” (Semetko & de Vreese, 2004, p. 93) but, on the 
other hand, such an issue-specific approach is considered to be rather subjective. Oftentimes, 
the issue-specific approach makes it difficult to generalize and compare the analysis. In order 
to get a better understanding of how various media systems, political interests, cultural and 
historical ties influence media framing, further studies of the topic need to address more 
generic and new issue-specific frames.  
The present study did not code for headlines and did not examine editorial materials, 
but only focused on news reports. Future framing studies on the referendum can pay 
particular attention to news stories’ headlines, subheads and leads as these elements are also 
known as powerful framing devices (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Future framing research can 
analyze editorial and opinion columns, as these materials are more likely to express the 
subjective view of the newspaper which strays from the objectivity norm. Besides text, 
further research can explore visual framing in the news coverage between two countries. 
During the analysis, the researcher noticed a photo or a short video report accompanies 
almost every online publication. Visuals can operate as framing devices which offer “a 
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number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame” (Gamson & Stuart, 
1992) and can also influence the evaluation of journalistic stories. 
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Appendix 
 
Codebook 
Coded By______________________   
Story Number__________________  
 
1. Online newspapers 
 
 (1) The New York Times     (2) Kommersant  
 
2. Publication date of the article 
 
(1)February 15, 2014 – March 15, 2014      (2) March 16, 2014 – April 16, 2014      
 
3. Story themes 
 
Please, code each publication into one of the five theme categories. Take into account only 
the dominant theme, other themes that may appear in the article should be neglected. 
(1) politics; 
(2) economy/finance; 
(3) military activities/ protests; 
(4) impact of the events on ordinary citizens; 
(5) other. 
 
4. Sources of attribution 
Source Yes/Present                 No/Absent 
Western government officials (including presidents, prime 
ministers and other politicians) 
  
Russian and Crimean government officials (including 
president, prime minister and other politicians) 
  
Ukrainian government officials (newly appointed prime 
minister and members of his government) 
  
Western experts (such as political commentators, professors)   
Russian experts (such as political commentators, professors)   
Representatives of international organizations (representatives of 
the UN, EU, etc.) 
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Other media outlets (newspapers or news agencies such as BBC, 
Associated Press, The Washington Post, The Guardian, Izvestia) 
  
Crimeans, Ukrainian civilians   
 
5. Story frames 
Please, code each article according to presence or absence of the frames identified below. Pay 
attention to certain phrases and keywords. A single story may contain multiple frames. 
 
Frame Yes/Present No/Absent 
1) Russia - invader. This frame focuses on illegitimate character of the 
Crimean referendum and depicts Russia as a violator of Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity. The frame includes such keywords and phrases as “occupation”, 
“annexation”, “Russia’s invasion/aggression”, “Russia invaded 
Crimea”, “Kremlin’s intervention”, “takeover”, “land grab”, “seizure 
of Crimea”, “incursion into Crimea”, “absorption”, “Kremlin’s grasp”. 
 
  
   2.1) Protection of the Russian population. This frame includes 
such phrases as “the right to protect the Russian-speaking population”, 
“a threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens”. 
  
2.2 ) Self-determination. This frame includes such phrases as “the 
right of self-determination”, “consistent with international law” 
  
2.3 ) Illegal Ukrainian government. This frame includes such 
keywords and adjectives describing Ukrainian government as “illegal”, 
“fascist”, “Bandera thugs”, “bandits”, “gangsters”, “an 
unconstitutional coup”. 
  
3.1) Breach of international law. This frame includes such 
keywords and phrases as “a violation of Ukrainian constitution/ 
sovereignty/territorial integrity”, “Russia’s unlawful actions”, 
“challenge to international agreements”, “breach of international law”, 
“unconstitutional”, “illegal/illegitimate”, “vote is fiction”. 
  
3.2) False referendum. This frame includes such keywords and 
adjectives describing the Crimean referendum as “separatist”, “farcical”, 
“false”, “phony”, “rigged”, “disputed”, “a farce”, “a fiction”, “a 
parody”, “a sham”. 
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4) Crimean ties. This frame emphasizes historical and cultural ties of 
Crimea and Russia. The frame includes such English as well as Russian 
keywords and phrases as “predominantly ethnic Russian region”, “the 
largely pro-Russian region”, “close/strong historical and/or linguistic 
and/or cultural ties to Russia”, “largely Russian-speaking Crimean 
peninsula”, “pro-Russian sentiment is widespread”, “home to a 
Russian naval base/Black Sea fleet”, “a nostalgic place in the minds of 
many Russians”. 
 
  
5)   Russian military actions. This frame focuses on Russian 
military operation on the peninsula and assumes that unidentified troops 
that occupied Crimean territory before and during the referendum were 
Russian special forces. The frame includes such keywords and phrases as 
“Russian military forces”, “Russian troops stripped of identifying 
insignia”, “military installations”, “deployment of Russian special 
forces”, “military exercise / military maneuvers”, “military 
preparations”, “Russia’s military moves”, “military buildup”, 
“escalation of Russian military actions”, “militiamen, backed by 
Russian forces”. 
  
6)   Threat to piece and security. This frame outlines risks and fears 
concerning the Crimean referendum and/or assumes which states may be 
occupied by Russia in future. The frame includes such keywords and 
phrases as “Cold War”, “pose a threat to peace and 
security/sovereignty of Europe”, “the next Crimea”, “a threat of 
military confrontation/ response”, “fears of a new military incursion”, 
“threaten to split society”, “a chilling prospect”, “a threat to the 
individual states of Europe”, “the Russian threat (expansionism), 
“geopolitical risks”, “threats of violence/intimidation”. 
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7)    Economic consequences. This frame emphasizes the 
economic consequences of the Crimean referendum. The frame includes 
such keywords and phrases as “sanctions”, “travel/visa bans and/or 
restrictions”, “asset freezes”, “economic blockade of Russia”, 
“economic punishment”, “suspension of Gazprom exports”, 
“economic isolation”, “damage to the economy”, “to punish/penalize 
Russia/ Putin”, “impact on the country’s economy”, “the state of 
Russia’s currency/ruble. 
  
8) Comparison frame. This frame compares the referendum in 
Crimea with previous, future and hypothetical referendums on status of 
other states and includes comparisons with Kosovo (Yugoslavia), 
Catalonia region (Spain), Scotland (Great Britain), Quebec (Canada), 
Dagestan (Russia), Chechnya (Russia), Tibet (China), Taiwan 
(China), Abkhazia (Russia), South Ossetia (Russia), northern Cyprus 
(Turkey), Nagorno-Karabakh (Russia), Transnistria (Moldova), 
South Sudan (Sudan), Palestine (Israel). 
  
9) Human interest. This frame focuses on the reaction and 
emotions of Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar civilians. Human interest frame 
refers to an effort to personalize the news in order to capture and retain 
audience interest. 
 
  
 
 
